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"The most heinous of all crimes".  
 Reflections on the structure of homicide in Scots law 
 
 
By Gerry Maher∗ 
 
 
"The different degrees of Homicide, considered as to their legal effect, are 
more the result of an improved system of law, than of any general and 
acknowledged rule, subsisting at all times, and founded on a just notion of the 




One of the classes taught by Gerald Gordon during his tenure as Professor of 
Criminal Law, and later in the Chair of Scots Law, at Edinburgh University was 
Honours Criminal Law.  I inherited this class and Gerald's reading lists when he left 
to take up an appointment to the shrieval bench in 1976.  The topics taught in that 
class over 30 years ago are not very much different from those included in Honours 
criminal law classes today.2  But one matter not covered then but almost without 
exception considered now is the structure of homicide offences, an aspect of the 
criminal law which has generated extensive appellate decisions, academic 
commentary, and proposals for law reform. It also happens to be a matter on which 
Gerald Gordon's own writings have played a significant role in the development of 





A useful starting point for this flurry of juristic activity is 15 July 1972.  In Coventry, in 
the early morning of that day, Pearl Kathleen Hyam killed 2 girls by setting fire to the 
house they were in. Her purpose in resorting to arson was to frighten the girls' 
mother, a rival for the affections of a man with whom she had previously had a 
relationship, into leaving the neighbourhood.  She did not intend to cause death or do 
injury to anyone.   But did she commit murder?  Was she a murderer?  'Yes' said a 
jury, the Court of Appeal and, in a decision which still provokes controversy, the 
House of Lords.3  Most of the opinions in this decision focused on the historical 
origins and contemporary authority on the mens rea of murder in English law, 
especially the question whether foresight of death or of serious bodily injury is 
equivalent to, or evidence of, intention.   
 
The only Scottish judge in that case was Lord KIlbrandon, who issued a short opinion 
agreeing with dissenting opinion of Lord Diplock.  But Lord Kilbrandon set out a more 
general point about the law of homicide:4 
                                               
∗ Professor of Criminal Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1 J Burnett, A Treatise on Various Branches of the Criminal law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 
1811), p 1 (note). 
2 See Appendix.  This was the syllabus for the class taught in the mid 1970s. 
3 Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55, a 3-2 majority decision.  
4 [1975] AC at 98E-H.  Similarly in R v Howe [1987] 1 AC 417, Lord Hailsham of St 
Marylebone said (at 433): "Murder, as every practitioner of the law knows, though often 
described as one of the utmost heinousness, is not in fact necessarily so, but consists in a 
whole bundle of offences of vastly differing degrees of culpability, ranging from brutal cynical 
and repeated offences like the so called Moors murders to the almost venial, if objectively 
immoral, 'mercy killing' of a beloved partner."   
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"My Lords, it is not so easy to feel satisfaction at the doubts and difficulties 
which seem to surround the crime of murder and the distinguishing from it of 
the crime of manslaughter. There is something wrong when crimes of such 
gravity, and I will say of such familiarity, call for the display of so formidable a 
degree of forensic and judicial learning as the present case has given rise to. 
I believe this to show that a more radical look at the problem is called for… .   
There does not appear to be any good reason why the crimes of murder and 
manslaughter should not both be abolished, and the single crime of unlawful 
homicide substituted; one case will differ from another in gravity, and that can 
be taken care of by variation of sentences downwards from life imprisonment. 
It is no longer true, if it was ever true, to say that murder as we now define it 
is necessarily the most heinous example of unlawful homicide."  
     
Yet how unlawful killings are to be separated and categorised has a longer history, 
and not only from a legal perspective.  Consider the following passage from Hamlet:5 
     
GHOST:    List, Hamlet, oh list. 
 If thou didst ever thy dear father love. 
HAMLET:  O God! 
GHOST:  Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder 
HAMLET:  Murder?  
GHOST:  Murder most foul, as in the best it is;  
But this most foul, strange, and unnatural. 
……… 
 
GHOST:  It's given out, that sleeping in my orchard, 
A serpent stung me: so the whole ear of Denmark 
Is by a forged process of my death 
Rankly abus'd: but know thou noble youth,  
The serpent that did sting thy father's life 
Now wears his crown 
HAMLET: O my prophetic soul,  
Mine uncle? 
 
This passage identifies a number of themes which feature in later debates.  One is 
the contrast between murder as such ('most foul, as in the best it is') and aggravated 
murder ('most foul, strange and unnatural').  Another is the method of killing 
(poisoning); and another, the characteristics of the victim (a king).  And a further point 
is the relationship between murderer and deceased (family members, brothers).   All 
of these issues have for long featured, and continue to do so, in discussions of the 
structure of homicide.  But to get an insight into contemporary debates one can 
consider the following list of offences. 
 
First, there is the distinction between murder and culpable homicide, and in English 
law murder and manslaughter.  These distinctions turn mainly on the required mental 
element for each offence, though the two legal systems define this key matter in 
different ways.  In Scots law, the definition of murder is still largely based on the 
words of Macdonald:6 
                                               
5 Act I, Scene 4.  
6 JHA Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland (5th edn, by J Walker 
and DJ Stevenson, 1948), p 89.  The addition of the term 'wickedly' to describe the intention 
to kill is derived from Drury v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 1013.  In that case the High Court 
radically re-interpreted the plea of provocation not as a mitigating circumstance which 
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"Murder is constituted by any wilful act causing the destruction of life, whether 
[wickedly] intended to kill, or displaying such wicked recklessness as to imply 
a disposition depraved enough to be regardless of consequences." 
 
By contrast culpable homicide is an unlawful killing where the accused lacks intention 
to kill or such wicked recklessness. 
 
In English law murder is committed when the accused unlawfully kills the victim in 
circumstances where he intends (a) to kill the victim, or (b) to cause the victim 
grievous bodily harm.  Manslaughter is an unlawful killing where the accused lacks 
either of these intentions 
 
The distinction between murder and culpable homicide (and the corresponding 
distinction in English law) is basic to our understanding of the law of homicide but the 
precise way of marking the difference between the two has always been 
controversial.  Because in modern law the distinction turns on mens rea, the offences 
are general homicide offences.  But we also have particular homicide offences, which 
involve some definitional element other than mens rea.   
 
In practical terms the most important of these involve killing on the roads.  In recent 
years there has been a mushrooming of statutory offences of road traffic homicides.  
These offences include causing death by dangerous driving;7 causing death by 
careless or inconsiderate driving;8 causing death by driving while unlicensed, 
disqualified or uninsured;9 and causing death by careless driving when under the 
influence of drunk or drugs.10  
 
A further statutory homicide offence is that of corporate homicide (corporate 
manslaughter in England) which can be committed only by a corporation or other 
type of organisation.11  
 
Furthermore, English law contains other particular homicide offences not known to 
Scots law.  One is causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult.12  
Another is infanticide, which operates more as a defence akin to diminished 
                                                                                                                                      
reduced murder to culpable homicide but rather as involving a type of criminal intention short 
of the 'wicked' intention which, according to the court, was part of the definition of murder.  
This re-interpretation is generally regarded as mistaken, and outwith the context of 
provocation the term 'wicked' adds little to the idea of intention in the context of murder  (see J 
Chalmers, "Collapsing the structure of criminal law" 2001 SLT (News) 241; M Christie, "The 
coherence of Scots criminal law: some aspects of Drury v HM Advocate" 2002 Jur Rev 273). 
7 Road Traffic Act 1988, s 1. 
8 S 2B (added by Road Safety Act 2006). 
9 S 3ZB (added by Road Safety Act 2006). 
10 S 3A (added by Road Traffic Act 1991). 
11 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. The types of organisation 
which can commit the offences are set out in s 1(2).   
12 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, s 5, a provision said to be needed to deal 
with the problem where a child is cared for by two people and dies as a result of ill treatment 
but it is not clear which carer ill-treated the child. The Act allows for both carers to be 
convicted of this offence. The Home Office has indicated that it is likely that there will be few 
prosecutions of the new offence (Home Office Circular 9/2005, Domestic Violence Crime and 
Victims Act). For a general discussion see Jonathan Herring, "Mum's Not the Word: An 
Analysis of Section 5, Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2994" in CMV Clarkson & 
Sally Cunningham (eds), Criminal Liability for Non-Aggressive Death (2008), ch 5.  
 4 
responsibility.  The offence arises where a mother kills her child (under the age of 12 
months) but her mental state was disturbed as a consequence of the birth.13  
 
There are also, towards or on the borderland of homicide offences, the crimes of 
concealment of pregnancy and abortion.  Concealment of pregnancy deals with the 
situation where a woman's failing to take steps during pregnancy and the birth of her 
child leads to the death of the child, which can gives rise to a statutory offence.14   
English law has a further offence of child destruction which involves the killing of a 
child which is capable of being born alive by causing it to die before it is has an 
existence independent of its mother.15 
 
Procuring an abortion, that is the destroying the life of a foetus at any time during 
pregnancy, is a crime at common law but this is subject to the provisions of the 
Abortion Act 1967. 
 
In Scots law suicide is not a crime,16 nor is attempted suicide.  It is not clear what 
offence, if any, is committed where two people make a suicide pact and one 
survives.17  By contrast, in English law the common law crime of suicide survived 
until abolished by statute in 1961 and there is a statutory offence of aiding, abetting 
or procuring a suicide or attempted suicide.18 Furthermore the survivor of a suicide 
pact who has killed the deceased or is party to him being killed by someone else is 
guilty of manslaughter (but not murder).19 
 
Moreover, different categories of homicide exist not just in relation to the definition of 
offences but also in relation to sentencing.  For example, in English law there are 
provisions for determining the minimum term to be given for the mandatory life 
sentence on a conviction for murder.20  Various starting-points are set out which 
depend on factors such as the murder of a child which involved sexual or sadistic 
motivation; murder of a police officer in the course of his duty; murder done for gain; 
whether the offender was below the age of 18. In addition, there are various factors 
which are aggravating (such as a significant degree of premeditation or concealment 
of the body) and mitigating (intention to cause serious bodily harm rather than to kill, 
or the offender having been provoked in a way not amounting to a defence of 
provocation). 
 
This snapshot of the structure of homicide captures the law in its current form but it is 
quite possible that this will change.  The English Law Commission has recommended 
                                               
13 Infanticide Act 1938.  A conviction of infanticide in effect reduces a charge of murder to one 
of manslaughter.  At the time of the 1938 Act English law had no plea of diminished 
responsibility, which was introduced by the Homicide Act 1957.  However, recently the 
English Law Commission has recommended that a separate offence of infanticide should be 
retained (Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304 (2006), 
Part 8). 
14 Concealment of Birth (Scotland) Act 1809.  This Act replaced an Act of 1690 (APS ix, 195, 
c 50).  One some views the offence is a species of the more general offence of culpable 
homicide (see Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes (4th edn, 
1844) I, 293).  
15 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. 
16 Mackenzie recognised a category of 'self-murder' which had significance for questions of 
succession to the self-murderer's estate (George Mackenzie, The Law and Customs of 
Scotland in Matters Criminal (2nd edn, 1699), vol I, tit XIII).  
17 For discussion see GH Gordon, "Suicide Pacts" 1958 SLT (News) 209. 
18 Suicide Act 1961, s 2. 
19 Homicide Act 1957, s 4(1). 
20 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 269 and Sch 21. 
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some important reforms.21  In particular the present two-tiered structure of murder 
and manslaughter would be replaced by a three-tiered structure of first degree 
murder; second degree murder; and manslaughter.  First-degree murder would cover 
intentional killings and killings with intent to cause serious injury where the accused 
was aware that his conduct involved a serious risk of causing death.  Second-degree 
murder would cover killing with intent to do serious injury and killing with intent to 
cause some injury or risk of such an injury where the accused was aware of a 
serious risk of causing death. It would also cover cases of what would otherwise be 
first degree murder but a partial defence of provocation, diminished responsibility, or 
killing pursuant to a suicide pact was made out.22  Crucially, the mandatory life 
sentence would apply to first-degree but not second-degree murder.  Manslaughter 
would extend to two situations: (1) killing through gross negligence and (2) killing 
through the commission of a criminal act which was either intended to cause injury or 
one that the accused was aware involved a serious risk of causing some injury.  
 
At much the same time these issues had been considered by the Law Reform 
Commission of Ireland,23 but the recommendations of that body varied from its 
English counterpart.  For a start the Irish Commission proposed that the mandatory 
life sentence for murder should be abolished.  Even if (as for political reasons is 
likely) that proposal was not accepted the mental element for murder should be 
broadened to include reckless killing manifesting an extreme indifference to human 
life.  The mental element should also, as under current Irish law, include intention to 
cause serious injury but should not be expanded to include recklessness as to 
serious injury.  The Commission also recommended that the law on unlawful and 
dangerous act manslaughter should be retained as should a reformulated version of 
gross negligence manslaughter.  In addition there should be a new homicide offence 





What is driving this increased and still increasing interest and activity on the law of 
homicide?  There are a number of overlapping origins for the recent interest in the 
structure of homicide offences.  
 
(i) Perhaps the most influential source for existence of debates and arguments about 
the law of homicide is to be found in academic and scholarly writings on criminal law.  
Criminal law has for long been a core academic subject but until relatively recently 
was one which gave rise to only sporadic literature.  This is not to say that writings on 
criminal law before this notional 'modern' era lacked depth.  Two of the most 
significant works written on the subject in the 20th Century are Glanville Williams' 
Criminal Law: The General Part (first published in 1953) and Gerald Gordon's own 
book, first published in 1967.  These books in turn inspired a blossoming of interest in 
the criminal law as an academic subject.  Over the last 25 years or so academic 
                                               
21 Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304 (2006), 
especially Part 2.  Most the recommendations in the Report are as yet unimplemented. 
22 The Commission also recommended re-formulation of the defences of provocation and 
diminished responsibility. 
23 Law Reform Commission (Ireland), Homicide: Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter (LRC 
No 87 (2008). 
24 Assault causing death would occur where an accused committed an assault which caused 
death and a reasonable person would not have foreseen that death or serious injury was 
likely to result in death. 
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writings have taken on a high level of maturity, combining both analytical 
sophistication and depth of normative theory.25 
 
There are two particular issues in this recent scholarship which have had an major 
impact of the structure of homicide offences, namely  fair labelling, and 'levels' of 




The idea that the criminal law should embody a principle of fair labelling has become 
an accepted orthodoxy in criminal law scholarship and has also been accepted as an 
important principle for reforming the criminal law.26  Its concern is with how criminal 
offences should be separated out from one another and with affixing each offence 
with a name or label that both describes that particular offence and marks it out as 
different from other offences, especially those similar or related to it in some way.  As 
such, it has obvious implications for the structure of homicide offences.      
 
However, despite its acceptance as a basic principle of criminal law, fair labelling has 
received very little detailed attention.27  So it is hardly surprising that when it is put 
under critical scrutiny a picture emerges of a concept or principle which operates at 
various levels and serves different purposes.  For example, labelling offences for the 
purpose of guiding sentencing decisions28 can result in a quite different set of 
categories from labels used to communicate with offenders or victims. Cutting across 
this kind of distinction is another which is more functional.  Chalmers and Leverick 
point out that for purposes of addressing the general public labelling is important as a 
mode of describing offences.  In contrast, where labelling is addressed at personnel 
working within the criminal justice system its function is that of differentiating offences 
or more importantly pointing to differences within one category of offence. 
 
In short, there is very little reason to suppose that there is one, and only one, way of 
labelling criminal offences, including homicide.  Rather there are a whole range and 
levels of labels, depending on the purpose of the exercise and its addressees. 
 
Levels of rules 
 
This conclusion is supported by another strand of contemporary criminal law theory.  
This is the distinction drawn between different levels of rules within criminal law.29  
The essential idea is that some rules are aimed at guiding the conduct of citizens, 
while others provide guidance for courts and other officials in determining questions 
                                               
25 For a useful survey of these developments see RA Duff, "Theorising Criminal Law: a 25th 
Anniversary Essay" (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353.  
26 For a comprehensive account of the topic see James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, "Fair 
Labelling in Criminal Law" (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 217.  An example of its application 
in law reform is Law Reform Commission (Ireland), Homicide: Murder and Involuntary 
Manslaughter (LRC No 87 (2008), paras 1.01-1.02 (headed 'labelling and moral culpability')). 
27 Chalmers and Leverick (op cit at p 220) noted that "while frequently deployed, however, fair 
labelling has sometimes been assumed to be a principle of self-evident value; it has often 
been invoked without any consideration of its underlying principles." 
28 An example in English law, noted earlier, is the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 269 and Sch 
21. 
29 The standard texts are Peter Alldridge, "Rules for Courts and Rules for Citizens" (1990) 10 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 487; M Dan-Cohen "Decisions Rules and Conduct Rules: On 
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law" (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 625; and PH Robinson, 
"Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication" (1990) 57 University of Chicago Law 
Review 729. 
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of breach of the criminal law and attribution of criminal responsibility.   Again, it has 
been recognised that this distinction has direct implications for the ways in which 
offences are described and differentiated.30   
 
(ii) A further explanation for the new interest in the structure of homicide lies in the 
work of law reform bodies, some of which has already been noted.  In both England 
and Wales and in Ireland the official law reform agencies were moved to considering 
questions of the law of homicide in general by earlier examination of the law on 
partial defences to homicide, especially provocation.31  In common law jurisdictions, 
many deep-rooted problems with the defence of provocation have been recognised 
by the courts and academic commentators, but there appears to be little hope of 
resolving these problems solely by the accepted law reform technique of proposing 
statutory redefinition.  Rather the reform of provocation depends upon much wider 
issues such as the retention of the mandatory life sentence for murder and the 
distinction between murder and other categories of homicide. 
 
A similar process may happen in Scotland.  The Scottish Law Commission has 
indicated that it may consider the defence of provocation,32 but it is difficult to see 
how this law reform project could proceed without the Commission first considering 
the mandatory sentence for murder and general issues of the structure of homicide 
offences. 
 
(iii) Another aspect of law reform which has implications for the law of homicide is the 
re-birth of interest in the codification of the criminal law.  The Law Commission in 
England and Wales had for a long time regarded its work on criminal law as part of a 
rolling programme of finalising a project on codification.33   
 
An unofficial Draft Criminal Code for Scotland, drawn up by a group of distinguished 
lawyers, was published in 2003.34   The Code does not, on the whole, deal with 
statutory offences and has nothing to say about homicide offences such as road 
traffic killings or corporate killings.  It retains an offence of abortion very much in its 
present form but this is explained as a matter of the legislative competence of the 
Scottish Parliament.35   
                                               
30 For example, Robinson, op cit at 758-764, accepts that whole criminal codes could be 
written at different levels and in different styles of language (what he calls Codes of Conduct 
and Codes of Adjudications).  
31 In its Report on Partial Defences to Murder (LC No 290 (2004), para 2.74), the Law 
Commission recommended that it should be asked to conduct a more general review of the 
law of murder. 
32 The topic was contained in the Commission's Seventh Programme of Law Reform but work 
on the project was delayed because of other commitments. The Commission has indicated 
that it intend to carry the subject over to its next programme. 
33 See, for example, Law Commission, 41st Annual Report 2006-07 (LC No 306), paras 5.16-
5.17; 42nd Annual Report 2007-08 (LC No 310), paras 5.14-5.23.  It is also worth noting that 
an official project for codifying the criminal law is under way in Ireland.  For a statement of the 
planned programme for the code, see Criminal Law Codification Advisory Committee, Annual 
Report 2008.  
34 Eric Clive, Pamela Ferguson, Christopher Gane, and Alexander McCall Smith, A Draft 
Criminal Code for Scotland with Commentary (2003) The authors note that Sir Gerald Gordon 
took part in discussions in the later stages of preparation of the draft (Draft Criminal Code, p 
1).  Despite its unofficial status the Draft Code has proved influential in law reform projects.  
See, for example, Scottish Law Commission, Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences 
(SLC No 209 (2007)), para 1.9.  
35 The intention of the Code team was that the Draft Code could be enacted by the Scottish 




The most direct aspect of the Draft Code on homicide offences is that it retains but 
redefines the distinction between murder and culpable homicide.  The distinction is 
drawn primarily in terms of mens rea,36 though provocation and diminished 
responsibility are kept as pleas which reduce a conviction for murder to one for 
culpable homicide. 
 
The working on criminal codes has the obvious connection with the structure of 
homicide offences for that very issue is an important part of any code.  But there is 
another significant, though perhaps less noted, point. This is the way in which 
homicide offences fit into the overall scheme of criminal offences and are 
differentiated from related offences (such as assault).37 
 
(iv) A further pragmatic explanation for some of the recent growth in separate 
offences is the existence of pressure groups involved with single issue politics who 
argue for specialised offences in the areas of concern to them. 38    This phenomenon 
is certainly in the background of some recent developments in English law noted 
earlier but it also applies to the new offence in Scots law of corporate homicide.39  
One problem about creating separate offences for separate situations, such as death 
in the work place or death of a vulnerable person, is that it might unduly fragment the 
law of homicide and disguise what these separate offences share with the broader 





This section will seek to identify the main issues in the debates of the structure of 
homicide and will offer some brief comments on possible solutions, especially from 
the perspective of Scots law.  It has to be said that, compared with other legal 
systems, there has been little discussion on many of these issues in Scotland.  
 
One point which should be noted at the start is that Scots criminal law has historically 
taken a wide approach to the categorisation of crimes, the clearest example being 
assault, which is essentially a unified crime, despite the recognition of various factors 
(both common law and statutory) which may aggravate the commission of an assault.  
There is a general culture of avoiding over-differentiation of offences.  Broad 
categories are preferred, with differences being marked out by means other the 
specification of different offences.  An example, which applies throughout criminal 
                                               
36 The mens rea of murder is defined as the intention of causing death or callous 
recklessness as to whether death is caused. (Draft Code, s 37(1)).  Culpable homicide 
involves the causing the death of person recklessly or by an assault or another unlawful act 
likely to cause significant physical harm where there is intention or recklessness as to causing 
such harm (Draft Code, s 38).  
37 The Irish Law Reform Commission has recommended that there should be a new offence 
of assault causing death but the Commission still see this offence as part of the law of 
homicide rather than the law of assault.  (Law Reform Commission, Homicide: Murder and 
Involuntary Manslaughter (LRC Report No 87 (2008)), para 5.46). 
38 See Jeremy Horder, "Homicide Reform and the Changing Character of Legal Thought" in 
CMV Clarkson & Sally Cunningham (eds), op cit at footnote 000, at pp 29-31.  
39 However, the politics of the changes brought about by the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Act are complicated by the fact that in Scotland much of the 
pressure group activity, especially by trade unions, was aimed at getting a bill before the 
Scottish Parliament.  Nonetheless, the point remains that focus was made in Scotland on 
creating a particular homicide offence that could be committed only by corporations and 
similar organisations.  
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offences, including homicide, is aggravation by way of racial motivation.40  More 
recently, however, there has been some move towards the use of a more elaborate 
differentiation of offences which fall within the heading of a general category of a 
crime.41 
 
A related point is that labelling of homicide offences aimed at sentencers has much 
less point in Scotland where, in contrast with legal systems such as England and 
Wales, the whole sentencing system is far less structured and considerably more 
emphasis is placed on the discretion of the sentencing judge. 
 
Homicide and the mandatory sentence for murder 
 
Perhaps the key issue in debates on homicide is the mandatory sentence for murder.  
Historically much of the development of the law on the distinction between murder 
and culpable homicide, especially in relation to the partial defences of provocation 
and diminished responsibility, depended on the fact that murder was a capital offence 
and that today it continues to attract a mandatory life sentence.  
 
Indeed in Hume's time there were two categories of murder: murder as such and 
aggravated murder.42  Hume gives several examples of this last sort of murders, 
such as murder under trust; killing in the royal presence; murder by assassination or 
poison; and the killing of a parent by a child or of child by a parent.43  But the 
distinction between murder and aggravated murder itself reflected differences in what 
happened to the murderer.  Hume explained that the pains of murder are death and 
confiscation of the moveable property of the murderer.44  But he also pointed out that 
aggravated murder, which in some cases had earlier been re-classified as a form of 
treason, had been punished with "forfeiture of life, lands, and goods."45 
 
Could and should the mandatory sentence be removed?  It is sometimes thought that 
public opinion would oppose this change and accordingly there would be no political 
will to introduce such a measure.   However, it is not totally inconceivable that at least 
in Scotland, as a separate political system from the United Kingdom as a whole, such 
a change might happen and that sentencing for all forms of homicide would be 
discretionary (though subject to guidelines laid down by statute or judicial 
determination, including cases where a life sentence would be appropriate.).      
  
                                               
40 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 96.  This approach, of not making separate offences but 
adding aggravating levels to existing crimes, applies also to crimes (including homicide) 
committed with prejudiced motivation in respect of a person's disability or sexual orientation 
(see Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009). 
41 For example, the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009.  Most of the provisions of this Act 
follow the recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission, which were based on a fair 
labelling principle. See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Rape and Other Sexual 
Offences (SLC No 209 (2007)), para 1.24. 
42  "I have now to treat of the cases of AGGRAVATED MURDER; those cases, where on 
account of some singular baseness or cruelty in the manner of the deed, or some peculiar 
relation between the parties, out custom proceeds against the murderer with more than 
ordinary severity." (Hume, I, 286.) 
43 Hume's category of aggravated murder helps to explain the agitation of the Ghost in Hamlet 
and why he uttered the famous phrase 'murder most foul.'  His killing was an aggravated 
murder at several levels: murder in the royal presence, indeed murder of the King; murder by 
poisoning; murder by way of assassination in the Scots law sense; and murder by a member 
of his own family.  
44 Hume, I, 284. 
45 Hume, I, 286. 
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Clearly if the mandatory sentence for murder remained, that situation would rule out 
one option for change, namely the reductionist approach of having one homicide 
offence.  But if the mandatory sentence were abolished, an unitary offence approach 
would not be the only option, for there could be good reasons, for example based on 
fair labelling, for retaining different categories of homicide, even in that scenario.  
What might happen is that the current distinction between murder and culpable 
homicide would disappear, as that distinction is too much based on history to have 
much point if the mandatory sentence were to go.  Different types of distinctions and 
classifications of homicides could instead be made. 
 
But how would Scots law react to proposals to adopt a unified approach to 
homicides? Reductionism entails the collapsing of the distinction between murder 
and culpable homicide, and with it partial offences, as well as the bringing into the 
offence what are currently road traffic and corporate homicides.46  A flavour of what 
such an offence would look like can be had from a suggested draft made by two 
writers who favour this approach:47   
 
"A person who, by any act or omission, intends to cause, or by behaviour 
manifesting recklessness, gross negligence or by reason of serious failure of 
corporate management, causes serious physical harm to another person 
resulting in that person's death, commits the offence of criminal homicide." 
 
Of course, an approach such as this does not mean that there are no essential 
distinctions between different sort of killings. The point is that the differences appear 
not in the definition of the offence but elsewhere, particularly in respect of sentencing.  
Thus killings involving provocation would be defined in exactly the same way as 
those where it is absent but provocation would be a matter for consideration at the 
stage of sentencing.48  It could be said that such a unified crime would parallel 
assault in Scots criminal law, which is one offence with one actus reus and one mens 
rea but which can be committed in a variety of aggravating ways or circumstances.  
But even on this definition homicide is not like assault, for there are a range of 
different fault elements involved in the unified homicide offence (seen most 
dramatically in 'serious failure of corporate management') which suggests different 
offences rather different ways of committing one offence. 
 
Allied to this point is the question of appropriate labelling.  Corporate homicide, for 
example, takes place in different social and moral contexts from a killing in the 
course of an armed robbery.  And there does seem to be an important moral 
difference between a killing which is the purpose of an accused's conduct and one 
which arises, for example, from an accused's acting recklessly by throwing stones 




                                               
46 But even this approach does not incorporate abortion which has always been regarded as a 
different from other types of taking life and no one has seriously suggested otherwise.  
47 L Blom-Cooper and T Morris, With Malice Aforethought (Hart, Oxford, 2004), p 175.  The 
next part of the draft clause states: "A person convicted of criminal homicide shall be liable to 
a sentence of life imprisonment, or a fine, unlimited in amount, or both, or such other non-
custodial penalty including a hospital order as the court might deem appropriate." 
48 And it might be argued (in the spirit of 'levels of rules' considered earlier) that as sentencing 
is a part of the criminal law aimed at official rather than citizens, the definition of provocation 
need not be made too finely, thus avoiding some of the problems with the present law in 
relation to that plea. 
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An opposite approach is to provide for different offences and labels to try to capture 
better than does the present law the richness of the ways in which different killings 
are differently wrong.  The trouble is that the overall picture might become too rich.  
Consider, for example, the argument that appropriate labelling might require the 
following separate categories of unlawful homicide:49 murder; killing upon 
provocation; killing during mental abnormality; killing by excessive force in self-
defence; killing under duress; reckless killing; grossly negligent killing; killing as a 
result of an attack.  To this list there can also be added: infanticide; corporate killing; 
causing death by dangerous driving (and other road traffic homicides). 
 
The difficulty with this type of differentiation is that it does not make clear why fair 
labelling requires such detailed distinctions to be made. The killings are different but 
do they all need a separate label? For example, killing upon provocation and killing 
during mental abnormality (which must be something lesser than insanity) obviously 
involve different sorts of ways in which the wrong of killing is modified by extenuating 
circumstances.  But at most all that this argues for is that the defences of provocation 
and diminished responsibility are defined as separate defences.  There is no need for 
the type of offence, to which they both act as a partial defence, to be itself 
differentiated in the same way.      
 
Differentiation based on factors other than fault 
 
A key element of the way in which homicide offences are currently structured is the 
mental element of the different offences.  Other criteria for distinguishing homicides 
could be by reference to the mode of killing or characteristics of the parties (victim or 
perpetrator).  Indeed this approach is already used in respect of road traffic and 
corporate homicides. It was noted earlier that Hume described a specific category of 
aggravated murder defined in terms of the nature of the assault and the identities of 
the parties.  
 
A more recent example of this approach can be found in the Homicide Act 1957, 
which arose out the work of a Royal Commission on capital punishment.  The 
Commission had considered the possibility of leaving alone the murder/culpable 
homicide (manslaughter) distinction but of sub-dividing murder into capital and non-
capital cases (as was and is the practice in some parts of the United States).  But the 
Royal Commission rejected this idea as being impractical and impossible to identify 
any coherent basis for the subdivisions.50  Nonetheless, the resulting legislation 
divided murders into capital and non-capital.51 Capital murders were those: done in 
the course of theft; by shooting or by causing an explosion; done resisting arrest; 
whilst escaping legal custody; of a police officer acting in the execution of his duty; of 
a prisoner of a prison officer; and repeat or multiple murders. 
 
As with Hume's list of aggravated murders, the main emphasis was on the method of 
killing and the identity of the victim.  The 1957 Act was not a success, and its repeal 
led the way to the abolition of the death penalty in 1965.  The problem with the 1957 
Act was that its categorisation of murder as capital and non-capital was driven solely 
by issues of penalty.  But, unlike more modern divisions of murder which use similar 
criteria for purposes of sentencing, it made no allowance for mitigating or 
(aggravating) circumstances within each category of capital killing. 
                                               
49 Andrew Ashworth & Barry Mitchell, "Introduction" in A Ashworth and B Mitchell (eds), 
Rethinking English Homicide Law (OUP, 2000), p 16. 
50 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (Cmnd 8932, 1953), p 189.  




Separate offences for road traffic and corporate killings 
 
Homicides arising from the driving of vehicles have been beyond the common law 
offences for decades.52  Of course where a car is used a weapon for attacking 
someone a charge of murder would be appropriate.  In HM Advocate v Purcell,53 a 
man was charged with murder where he killed a pedestrian while driving a car 
recklessly.  The court held that in the absence of an intention to injure the victim a 
conviction for murder was not possible.  But at the same time the offence committed 
in this case was a common law culpable homicide, which suggests that such an 
offence could have been itself charged rather than an offence under the Road Traffic 
Act.  The question, then, is whether in principle there is any point in having such 
separate statutory offences.  There is a convincing case for the view that road traffic 
offences are essentially concerned with criminalising dangerousness; where death 
occurs as a consequence of driving, the conduct should be treated as culpable 
homicide provided it falls within the range of that offence.54 From the perspective of 
fair labelling, what matters is that death has occurred unlawfully, the fact that it is 
caused by driving seems of much less significance. 
 
Another area where a separate offence exists is corporate homicide introduced by 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.  There is no doubt 
that the offence under the 2007 Act, whatever its defects, is an improvement upon 
the common law approach to corporate homicide in Scotland, and in particular the 
insistence of the courts in adhering to the need to identify a specific person or 
persons within a corporation who had the necessary controlling, and guilty, mind.  
But the common law could have developed differently, and the adoption of a test of 
an aggregating or cumulative theory of corporate activity or of management failure 
was not beyond the scope of proper judicial development.  Nor would it be sufficient 
to leave prosecution of corporate failings, especially those involving death, to laws 
dealing health and safety at work. It would be literally a category error to consign a 
form of criminal homicide to that part of the law.  Criminal homicides are part of the 
law of homicide.  At the same time failure by the court to develop legal doctrine on 
corporate liability could have put right by reforming the law on corporate liability could 
have been made in the context of the common law offence rather than by creating a 
separate statutory offence.  As against this view, the very fact that a specialised form 
of guilty mind would have been required even for common law purposes suggests 
that the offence itself should be differently categorised.   
 
Redrawing the division between murder and culpable homicide 
 
In the previous discussion on whether there should be separate offences for road 
traffic and corporate killings, one reason for retaining separate offences is that the 
present law on murder and culpable homicide is itself unsatisfactory.  There are large 
issues involved in the discussion of the division between murder and culpable 
                                               
52 Historically separate statutory road traffic homicide offences were justified on the basis that 
juries were thought to be reluctant to convict of murder or culpable homicide drivers who 
caused death by driving dangerously or carelessly.  But even if this was the case, it seems an 
unprincipled basis for a separate category of road traffic homicide offences.  Moreover, if 
there were such views in the past, public attitudes towards killing on the road now appear to 
be more inclined towards treating them as akin to common law homicides.  See B Mitchell, 
"Further Evidence of the Relationship Between Legal and Public Opinion on the Law of 
Homicide" [2000] Crim L Rev 814, 823-824.    
53 2008 JC 131. 
54 See Sally Cunningham, "Vehicular Homicide: Need for a Special Offence" in CMV Clarkson 
& Sally Cunningham (eds), op cit at footnote 000, 97-123. 
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homicide, but as with many parts of the criminal law, the debate in Scots law is very 
much underdeveloped when compared with other legal systems.  It must also be 
borne in mind that the distinction does not necessarily depend on the existence of a 
mandatory sentence for murder. If the mandatory sentence were to go, the issue 
would still arise whether murder and culpable homicide should be distinguished, and 
if so, how.  
 
In most general terms, the issues involve the desirable scope of the crime of murder 
and the related matter of the nature and structure of culpable homicide.   
 
One major problem is that culpable homicide is too widely defined, and contains quite 
disparate elements.  Indeed it has for long been thus.  Hume described the structure 
of homicide offences in terms of four separate levels:55 
 
(a) Non-blameable homicide, sub-divided into (i) casual homicide and (ii) 
justifiable homicide; 
(b) Homicide less than murder but blameable; 
(c) Murder; 
(d) Aggravated murder. 
 
In modern times aggravated murder has disappeared, at least as a category of 
homicide offence. In modern eyes the key distinction is between (b) and (c). But for 
Hume the crucial contrast lay elsewhere.  For Hume the primary distinction was 
between (a) on the one hand and on the other hand (b), (c), and (d) taken together.  
That is to say, the crucial part of the structure is the difference between non-culpable 
homicide and all the categories of culpable homicide. On this basis culpable 
homicide is not a lesser version of murder; rather murder is a greater type of culpable 
homicide.56  The difficulty is that the second level has no clearly marked-out name.  
Culpable homicide becomes a residual category; it is the type of blameworthy killing 
which is not murder.  But unless we already know how to define murder this category 
becomes difficult to grasp. 
 
In the present law culpable homicide remains the residual category but there is 
simply too many disparate elements within its scope. 57  Murder is still essentially 
defined in the terms of Macdonald as:58 
 
"Murder is constituted by any wilful act causing the destruction of life, whether 
[wickedly] intended to kill, or displaying such wicked recklessness as to imply 
a disposition depraved enough to be regardless of consequences." 
 
An unlawful killing which is not caught by this definition is, unless it is a separate 
species of homicide, a form of culpable homicide.  But within culpable homicide there 
are several subdivisions. The problem is that these subdivisions are not 'official' 
categories of culpable homicide but act rather as analytical distinctions.  
Nonetheless, they do indicate important differences between types of culpable 
homicide and the issue of appropriate labelling therefore arises. 
                                               
55 Hume, I, 191. 
56 The distinction between culpable and non-culpable homicide and of murder being a 
particular form of culpable homicide has a long tradition. It appears also in the 19th Century 
criminal codes (see for example, Indian Penal Code 1860, ss 299-301).  
57 This can be seen from Hume's opening discussion of this point where he says that 
"culpable homicide appears to be of several kinds and degrees; and these are grounded in 
different reasons" (I, 233). 
58For explanation of the additional 'wickedly' to qualify intention see footnote 000 above. 
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One such distinction is between voluntary and involuntary culpable homicide.  This 
terminology is confusing and should be avoided. A so-called voluntary culpable 
homicide is one where the conduct falls within the scope of murder but where an 
extenuating factor exists in the form of provocation or diminished responsibility.  The 
effect of this factor is that the accused is not liable to be convicted of murder but 
instead of culpable homicide.   
 
The historical explanation for the recognition of these partial defences is the need to 
avoid applying a mandatory penalty, especially when that was capital in nature, when 
these mitigating circumstances are present.  But these culpable homicides are quite 
different from the others.  Furthermore, labelling requires not only that they should 
not be called murder but that they should be distinguished from other culpable 
homicides.  The question then is what is an appropriate label. As already noted, the 
English Law Commission has recommended a three-tiered structure of homicide 
offences.  Murder would be divided into two degrees. The mandatory sentence would 
apply to first degree, but not to second degree, murder. The problem with the 
Commission's recommendation is that in includes in second degree murder 
homicides where there an intent to do serious injury and or intent to cause injury 
where there is awareness of a serious risk of causing death.  Whether such killings 
are to be classified as murder or manslaughter is one thing but labelling cases of 
provocation and diminished responsibility along with these killings seems wrong.  
Killing under extenuating circumstances is not murder and should have its own 
separate label. 
 
Involuntary culpable homicides are those which are not voluntary ones.  Within the 
level of involuntary culpable homicides, there is a further distinction between lawful 
act killings (where a fault element of gross negligence is required) and unlawful acts 
killings (where death occurs as a consequence of a criminal act even though there is 
no intention to kill or to injure the accused).  There is much work to be done in 
working out this distinction, which in practice can become blurred.  As for the 
unlawful act type, it is not entirely clear which crimes do and should attract this label 
when death occurs.59 The notion of lawful act culpable homicide is unsatisfactory.  
What transforms the act into a type of homicide when death ensues is a degree of 
negligent acting which displays a state of mind that is criminally indifferent as to 
consequences.60 But there is an element of circularity in this approach.  A lawful act 
becomes a criminal one when committed with a criminal state of mind.  It is difficult to 
be precise about when negligence becomes so gross that it is of form of mens rea.   
 
More fundamentally whatever the contours of unlawful and lawful act culpable 
homicides, should they be labelled as the same sort of crime? This approach has 
long been adopted in Scots law, as in other systems.61   But do they involve the 
same sort of wrong? If not, should there be separate labels for the two categories, 
                                               
59 At present assault does but here there is a clear moral link between committing an attack 
with evil intent and holding the accused liable for an ensuing death even if that death was not 
intended. It is less easy to identify such a link in other offences. 
60 This is the formulation made in the classic case of Paton v HM Advocate 1936 JC 19.  The 
emphasis on gross negligence as evidencing a criminal state of mind has been made in later 
cases (see, for example, Transco plc v HM Advocate 2004 JC 29). 
61 The English Law Commission's most recent work of the structure of homicide, which is very 
much informed by the principles of fair labelling, has recommend that manslaughter should 
continue to categorise unlawful act and lawful act killings as undifferentiated forms of 
manslaughter. (Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304 
(2006)).  A similar approach was adopted by the Law Reform Commission of Ireland (see 
Homicide: Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter (LRC No 87 (2008)). 
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not just as analytical distinctions but legal categories? Furthermore where death 
occurs as a consequence of an act which is itself a type of crime, does the fatal 
outcome require a different offence or should it rather be an aggravating factor of that 




It is obvious that clarity is needed as to what should fall within the scope of culpable 
homicide.  There is another major issue to consider. This concerns the desirable 
scope of the offence of murder; in other words, how to draw the line between murder 
and culpable homicide.  An appropriate way of considering these issues is to look at 
the views of Sir Gerald Gordon. 
 
Gordon's massive contribution to the writings on Scottish criminal law is based on a 
wide range of journal papers but in particular his monograph on Criminal Law.62   
This book is one of the major pieces of writing on criminal law in the English-
speaking world and its influence has been felt well beyond Scotland.  It is not a re-
working or updating of Hume but a statement of general principles of criminal law 
along with detailed discussions of the main offences in Scot criminal law.   It is 
characterized by a theoretical rigour, integrating the writings of philosophers such as 
Gilbert Ryle, JL Austin, and Wittgenstein.  A major influence was the work of 
Glanville Williams on English law, especially in relation to the need to understand 
mens rea primarily in a subjective sense but Gordon adopts a more nuanced 
approach to this issue than did Williams.  Gordon accepts that intention as a form of 
mens rea must be subjective in nature but he argues that issues of interpreting and 
proving intention lessen the force of a subjective/objective distinction.63  But, like 
Williams, Gordon did accept (at least on the context of murder) that recklessness 
should be understood subjective as otherwise the idea would collapse into 
negligence. 
 
Though Gordon was willing to depart from Hume on the content of the law of 
homicide, in large part he follows the structure of the discussion set down by his 
predecessor in the chair of Scots Law.   Gordon's begins with a consideration of 
general issues relating to criminal law (the general part), which is followed by 
examination of specific offences.  Like Hume, Gordon does not take murder as his 
first topic, which is instead offences of dishonesty.  The next part deals with non-
sexual offences involving injury, and it is the second section of that part which 
considers homicide.  Chapter 23 (of the first edition) considers murder.  This chapter 
sets out in some 3 or 4 pages a discussion of homicide in general, including classes 
of homicide, largely on the Humean pattern.   
 
When discussing murder as such Gordon suggests a distinction between 'voluntary' 
murder (characterized by the presence of an intention to kill) and 'involuntary murder' 
where there is no such intention.64  At the end of this chapter he moves on to discuss 
'justifiable homicide' but this is brief, and the topic of self-defence is dealt with on its 
own in the following chapter.  The next chapter considers so-called 'voluntary' 
culpable homicide but this chapter focuses on provocation, and other partial or 
reductive defences to murder which can result in voluntary culpable homicide such 
                                               
62 The first edition was published in 1967, the second edition in 1978.  The third edition 
(volume 1, 2000; volume 2, 2001) was not edited by Gordon.   
63 The key writing here is GH Gordon, "Subjective and Objective Mens Rea" (1974-75) 17 
Criminal Law Quarterly 355, a paper which shows distinctly Wittgensteinian influence. 
64 "It is undisputed that murder can be committed unintentionally, that is to say, without any 
intention to kill the deceased" (1st edn, p 679). 
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as diminished responsibility or intoxication65 are dealt with in other parts of the book. 
The following chapter deals with 'involuntary' culpable homicide, and the discussion 
considers the three categories of lawful conduct culpable homicide; assault culpable 
homicide; and 'other' unlawful conduct culpable homicide. 
 
The general theme running through the discussion of homicide, especially murder, is 
that Scots law is uncertain and at times difficult to state.  Gordon recognizes that its 
flexibility has advantages but his attitude towards this flexibility is never entirely free 
from ambiguity.66 
 
But certain issues are dealt with more on general principle than as according with the 
dicta of decided cases.  On one particular issue Gordon's view have been clear and 
unwavering, namely that the mental element of murder (and hence of the scope of 
the crime) must be read narrowly.  Clearly intention to kill suffices; but in the absence 
of such intention there must be an intention to cause injury in circumstances 
amounting to a display of wicked recklessness.  At times there has been a tendency 
to use the idea of wicked recklessness loosely as embodying an objective judgment 
of the accused's conduct.  But this is not Gordon's approach.  For him the paradigm 
case of murder is where there is intention to kill.   But where there is intention to 
cause injury there may also be circumstances which make the accused's state of 
mind morally equivalent to that of someone who intends to take life:67 
 
"Murder is the most heinous of all crimes, and cannot be present in the 
absence of wickedness and depravity.  Such wickedness and depravity is 
clearly present where the killing was intentional; where the killing was 
unintentional but caused by an assault these qualities must be found in the 
nature of the assault, which must exhibit 'wicked recklessness'.  
Recklessness is therefore not so much a question of gross negligence as of 
wickedness.  Wicked recklessness is recklessness so gross that it indicates a 
state of mind which is as wicked and depraved as the state of mind of a 
deliberate killer."       
 
In HM Advocate v Purcell,68 an accused was charged with murder where it was 
alleged that a boy had been killed after he was struck by a car which the accused 
had been driving in a dangerous manner but where the accused had not any 
intention to injure the boy.  The court held that the absence of such intention meant 
                                               
65 This position reflects the then rule that an accused who killed, but by reason of intoxication 
could not form the intention to kill or do serious injury, could not be convicted of murder but 
only of culpable homicide.  This rule was critically examined by Gordon (1st edn, pp 357-362).  
It was removed by the decision in Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 JC 1. 
66 "The absence of an academically satisfactory definition of murder is, however, perhaps but 
a small price to pay for the practical advantage of flexibility" (1st edn, p 683). 
67 1st edition, p 683 (emphasis added).  This passage has remained virtually unchanged in 
later editions (see 2nd edition, para 23-17, pp 735-736; 3rd edn, vol 2, para 23.19, p 297).   
Gordon has more recently re-affirmed this key point: "Murder has never been restricted to 
intentional killing, and I am far from persuaded that the acceptance of recklessness as a 
mens rea for murder arose out of the idea that intention could be inferred from recklessness.  
Be that as it may, it is clear that recklessness is an independent form of mens rea and not just 
evidence of intention.  But the law does require some form of intention to support the basic 
requirement of wickedness, and the only form acceptable, at least nowadays, is an intention 
to cause physical injury: it is not any conduct displaying wicked recklessness but only wicked 
recklessness in the carrying out of such an intention, which makes homicide murder" 
(Commentary on HM Advocate v Purcell 2007 SCCR 520, 530). 
68 2008 JC 131, [2007] HCJ 13. 
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that the accused's conduct did not amount to murder, and expressly approved this 
passage (and others) in Gordon's book.69  
 
Clearly there are issues still to be resolved as to the scope of the crime of murder in 
Scots law.  But for many of these the writings of Sir Gerald Gordon will usually be the 
first word, and often the final word, in finding the solution. 
 









                                               
69 "And talking of the modern law we would comment, importantly, that it should be noted that 
the views expressed in regard to that domain in the 3rd edition of Gordon are those expressed 
in the 1st edition, published some 40 years ago in 1967.  Since that time they have 
represented the accepted views among jurists which have not been the subject of any 
subsequent challenge." [para 16].   The same passage was treated as significant in Petto v 
HM Advocate 2009 SLT 509, [2009] HCJAC 43.  That case involved a charge of murder that 
the accused had killed a man and then set fire to the flat where the victim lived.  The fire 
spread throughout the building and killed a woman living on another flat. It was accepted that 
the accused must have known that other flats in the building would have been occupied at the 
time he started the fire.  The case was remitted to a fuller bench on the issue whether on 
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